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8.1  Introduction 
Sweden is a “high-price’’ country. This seems evident to the casual visitor, 
and it is confirmed by more systematic evidence. For example, table 8.1 shows 
that, even after the 20 percent depreciation of the krona in 1992, Swedish con- 
sumer prices remain higher than in most developed countries. Moreover, avail- 
able data indicate that Sweden’s high-price status goes back at least to the late 
1960s (Lipsey and Swedenborg  1993), a period encompassing considerable 
exchange rate fluctuations. These high prices cannot be entirely explained by 
Sweden’s income  level  (see  fig. 8.1) or  by  its  high  indirect  taxes  (Lipsey 
and Swedenborg  1993). In this paper, we will try to assess the contribution 
of Swedish competition and regulatory policy to these high prices. 
To an outsider, especially an American conditioned by  that country’s anti- 
trust laws, Swedish policy on competition has been remarkably lax. Until June 
1993, cartel agreements were legal in Sweden. While they could not be en- 
forced in the courts, firms were free to enter into essentially the whole range 
of agreements-price  fixing, sharing of  markets, allocation of  retail outlets 
among manufacturers, etc.-that  are per se violations subject to criminal pen- 
alties under American law. Only resale price maintenance agreements and joint 
tendering on public contracts were prohibited. Cartel agreements had to be 
publicly registered on request from the SPK (Swedish National Price and Car- 
tel Board). In principle, agreements could be struck down if found to be against 
the  public  interest.  However,  the  (1  946) legislation  establishing  the  cartel 
register put few sanctions at the government’s disposal, and, in spite of succes- 
sive  strengthening  of  the  government’s powers  (1953,  1956,  1982), cartel 
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Table 8.1  Relative Consumer Prices at Current Exchange Rates, Index 
Sweden = 100 

























































































agreements were largely unrestrained until  1993. In  1992, there were  1,250 
agreements in the cartel register. As of  1989, about 15 percent of total sales of 
goods and services in Sweden were found to be affected by horizontal cartel 
agreements (SPK 1992). Of  these sales, around 55 percent were affected by 
price-fixing agreements, 15 percent by  market-sharing agreements, 15 percent 
by  combined price-fixing and market-sharing agreements, and the remainder 
by  other forms of horizontal cartel agreements.’ 
In principle, these cartel agreements are constrained by exposure to intema- 
tional competition. However, as shown in table 8.2, a considerable share of 
Swedish output does not face import competition. In this sense, the outsider’s 
view of  Sweden as the quintessential “small, open economy” is exaggerated. 
Table 8.2 also shows that a considerable share of Swedish output is sheltered 
from competition by  regulation, cartel restrictions, or subsidies. 
In  1993, Sweden’s law on competition was changed to bring it in line with 
EC rules. The overriding objective is to widen the applicability of  the per se 
1. The SPK and another authority, the competition commissioner (SKA, established in  1982). 
also investigated restrictive business practices. In principle, the SKA could prosecute practices 
that injured competition in a market court. In practice, however, most cases were settled by negoti- 
ation; I  or 2 percent were referred to the market court. Relative price level (OECD=100) 
160 7-~~  ~___  ~  ~-  -  ~- 
A. 1990. 
















4OLi  I  I  I  I;  I  I  I  FA  i  I  I  ~  I  I  I  I  ::  tttk 
40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  100  105  110  115  120  125  130 
GNP per capita (OECD=100) 
Relative price level (OECD=100) 
160 -- 










USA  I 
Can 
UMUS  .  -- 
+A 
40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 
GNP per capita (OECD=100) 
Fig. 8.1 
after devaluation. 
Real incomes and relative market prices. a, 1990. b, 1992 318  Stefan Folster and Sam Peltzman 
Table 8.2  Three Measures of the Swedish Economy’s Exposure to Competition 
Measure of Exposure to Competition  Share of Total (%) 
Import competition: 
1. Import penetration in private production 
2. Share of private production with import penetration greater than 
16 percent  16 
3. Share of production affected by government subsidies: 
15.1 
Output subsidies: 
Private production  17 
Private and public production  36 
Private consumption  62-79 
4. Share of  consumption affected by restrictions on competition: 
Private and public consumption  75-84 
Source: Measures 1 and 2 come from Flam, Horn, and Lundgren (1993). Measures 3 and 4 come 
from Anderson et al. (1993). 
Note: Measures 1 and 2 refer to the year 1989. Measures 2 and 4 are based on import penetration 
per industry branch. Measures 3 and 4  refer to the year 1991. 
rule. Most notably, horizontal price-fixing and market-sharing agreements are 
now illegal regardless of whether they can be proved to have harmful effects.* 
The only  ground  for exemption  is increased  competition.  For example, an 
agreement between smaller firms can be accepted if it is shown to strengthen 
competitive pressures on larger firms. By conforming its rules to those in the 
EC, Sweden joins a European trend toward more reliance on the per se rules 
that are common in U.S.  law. Prior law in the European Community as well as 
Sweden permitted  action  against restrictive  practices  only if  they could be 
proved to be against the public interest. 
Economists rarely get the opportunity to study the actual effects of cartels. 
Sweden’s relaxed pre-1993 institutions, in which cartels were a matter of public 
record (the cartel register was abolished in the  1993 law), provide  such an 
opportunity, and we take advantage of it. The results we obtain may, however, 
be of more than purely academic or historical interest. At this writing, no one 
can be sure how Sweden’s new law will work in practice. In particular, if past 
formal  arrangements  among rivals  are replaced  by  similar informal under- 
standings, some of the effects we uncover may endure. 
8.1.1  Government Regulation 
Much concern has been expressed, most recently by the Lindbeck Commis- 
sion (Lindbeck et al. 1994, chap. 3), that government regulation of markets in 
Sweden contributes to high prices by reducing competition. In this respect, the 
Lindbeck Commission reflects a growing wariness among economists about 
the potential anticompetitive effects of regulation  that emerged from the so- 
2. Fines for violation of the law have also been increased considerably (at most 10 percent of 
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called  economic theory  of regulation3 More specifically, the report evinces 
concern that Sweden’s regulatory institutions may be especially restrictive. It 
cites food and housing (together accounting for half of private consumption) 
as prime examples. In the food sector, government  intervention  begins  with 
raw material prices, which are set considerably above world market prices. In 
this respect, Sweden does not differ from the European Community, but the 
implied subsidies are higher. The high input prices then engendered various 
tariff and regulatory barriers (e.g., product standards, minimum prices) to pro- 
tect processors against import competition. Finally, entry at the retail level was 
subject to municipal zoning regulation, which was often used to protect the 
two biggest chains. It is perhaps unsurprising that this “vertically integrated” 
regulatory structure parallels the important participation of farmers’ coopera- 
tives at all three levels. 
In housing, regulation  originated with public  subsidies intended to over- 
come shortages induced by rent control. The government specified the features 
of buildings that qualified for the subsidies. As with food, the housing regula- 
tion bred a web of  political  interests, including builders and their suppliers, 
that influenced the subsequent evolution of  the regulation. Design standards, 
product registration laws, licensing requirements, etc. tended to keep foreign 
contractors  and  suppliers out and  to retard domestic  entry  as well  (OECD 
Food and housing may be extreme cases, but they exemplify  a tendency 
toward regulatory intervention that many Swedes believe goes well beyond the 
ostensible public purpose (assuring the supply of food or housing) in the direc- 
tion  of  reducing competition  and raising  costs. This belief, combined  with 
Sweden’s move to harmonize its regulatory  system with EEC rules, has pro- 
duced counterpressures. During recent years, a number of areas have been de- 
regulated.  For example, the  restrictions  on entry of  food  stores have been 
eased, and a large number of low-price supermarkets have opened. The Euro- 
pean Economic  Space (EES) treaty  is likely to add to the pressure for less 
regulation. A basic principle  within the EES is that any product that is legal 
in one member country can be freely imported into another (Cassis de Dijon 
principle). While exceptions to the principle may be granted for a variety of 
 reason^,^ the EEC court has so far granted exceptions sparingly. Accordingly, 
the sort of protection that has been granted to the Swedish food and building 
industry may be reduced. 
As with Swedish competition law, it is too early to tell how the legal changes 
in the regulatory  sphere will work out in practice. In this paper, we examine 
the effect of a selected and undoubtedly poorly measured set of Swedish regu- 
1992,82-83). 
3. The original development of the economic theory is due to Stigler (1971). A  summary of 
subsequent work may be found in Peltzman (1989). 
4. These include safety, protection of life, public order, protection of national treasures, protec- 
tion of industrial or commercial ownership, effective tax control, good trading practices, public 
resource savings, consumer protection, protection of culture, environment, and work environment. 320  Stefan Folster and Sam Peltzman 
latory policies on prices and productivity. We find that they have, at the same 
time, promoted cartelization and have had more profound price and productiv- 
ity effects than cartelization. Therefore, the speed with which Swedish prices 
will converge toward those in the European Economic Community depends in 
part on how quickly Swedish regulatory practice accommodates to the pressure 
for deregulation. 
8.1.2  Industrial Concentration 
The success of large multinational firms is one of the hallmarks of Swedish 
economic development. In areas like automobiles and trucks, telephone equip- 
ment, domestic appliances, electrical machinery, metal fabrication, and indus- 
trial machinery, Swedish firms are well-known and substantial players all over 
the world. Per unit of GDP, Sweden has twice as many corporations among the 
five hundred largest in the world as Japan and four times as many as the United 
States. These large Swedish multinationals convey the impression that Sweden 
is a land of big businesses. Because much of the production and sales of these 
multinationals takes place abroad, this impression is perhaps exaggerated. But 
it is not altogether misleading. At least in the industrial sector, the available 
data suggest that Swedish production is relatively concentrated. For example, 
in a cross-country comparison of twelve industries (Scherer et al. 1975), the 
average four-firm concentration ratio in Sweden (.834)  was the highest among 
the six countries st~died.~  In only nine of  the seventy-two cases studied did 
the concentration ratio reach  1.0, but six of these were Swedish. So Swedish 
industries seem characterized by unusually few firms as well as high concen- 
tration.6 
The database used in this paper, which we describe more fully later, gives 
concentration data at the product level. Concentration data at this fine level of 
disaggregation are scant, so international comparison is impossible. However, 
our data leave little doubt that Swedish product markets are highly concen- 
trated by any reasonable standard. For the eighty-three broadly representative 
products  in our sample, the average Herfindahl index  (the  sum of  squared 
shares) for annual Swedish production from 1976 through 1990 was SO.  This 
is the equivalent of just two equal sized producers per product. The actual 
number of producers per product in our sample averages 2.5 and never ex- 
ceeds 5. 
5.  Canada was second (.708).  The other countries studied included the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany. In part, higher concentration ratios for Sweden may of course 
reflect a small-country effect. 
6.  There is also extensive conglomeration of ownership and control. In 1985, the five biggest 
final owners held some 44 percent of  the total voting rights in companies with more than five 
hundred employees, while the ten biggest had more than half (SOU 1990).  In addition, these final 
owners tend to hold shares through intermediaries, such as investment companies, which in turn 
are linked through joint ownership. Fourteen such “empires” dominate the corporate sector, with 
three major ones alone controlling companies that account for some two-thirds of employment, 
sales, and total assets of the 270 largest corporations in Sweden. 321  The Social Cost of Regulation and Lack of Competition in Sweden 
High concentration tends to evoke concern about the vigor of competition. 
This concern is reflected in antitrust laws like those in the European Commu- 
nity that Sweden has adopted. Mergers, which were essentially unrestricted in 
Sweden before, will now come under greater legal scrutiny. However, it is far 
from clear on purely a priori grounds whether Sweden’s high concentration has 
been a source of competitive strength or weakness. To some degree, achieving 
economies of  scale requires higher concentration in smaller countries. More 
generally, high concentration can reflect differential efficiency, which results 
in lower rather than higher prices (Demsetz 1973). For example, if one or two 
producers discover lower marginal cost production methods, their output and 
market share will rise, and the extra output will tend to lower prices. A highly 
restrictive  merger policy  could end up  penalizing  efficiency  if  it slows the 
spread of low-cost  production  methods. Indeed,  some of  the results  in  this 
paper lend weight to this possibility. 
While Swedish concentration remains high, it has been declining recently. 
In our sample, the average Herfindahl index declined from ,563 in 1976 to .483 
by  1984 and remained  at this  level thereafter. This decline has roughly  the 
same effect on average concentration as would adding one average-sized firm 
to every third or fourth product market. In fact, however, new entry played no 
role in this decline of concentration. It was driven entirely by  a sharp decline 
in the average market share of the largest firm from .64 in 1976 to .52 in 1990. 
As indicated above, this development does not necessarily  signal an increase 
in competition. It could reflect waning productivity  advantages of the largest 
firms. 
Perhaps as interesting as the decline in concentration is the fact that it has 
been accomplished without any net new entry. Davis and Henrekson (chap. 9 
in this volume) argue that Swedish tax policy has been biased in favor of large, 
capital intensive, widely held firms. This bias may have been motivated by the 
fact that income in small firms is difficult to separate from the owner’s personal 
income. Therefore, small firms’ income was taxed progressively in accordance 
with the welfare  state’s ambition to  equalize incomes. Whatever the motiva- 
tion, this  tax bias  may have discouraged new entry of small, privately held 
firms  and  thereby  removed  potential  competitive  constraints  on  the  estab- 
lished firms. 
8.1.3  Public Procurement 
Public procurement accounts for about 20 percent of GNP. Forty percent of 
that  is procurement  by  the central government,  while  the  remainder  is ac- 
counted for by municipalities and counties. In addition, many services are pro- 
duced publicly that could be bought from private producers. In recent years, 
municipalities have begun to expose their technical and even social services to 
competition, and in  some cases they have also turned to private producers. 
Table 8.3 summarizes the results of  a recent study (Folster 1993) that shows 
that substantial quality-adjusted cost savings were achieved in municipal and 322  Stefan Folster and Sam Peltzman 
Table 8.3  Quality-Adjusted Cost Reductions after Privatization in 
Municipal Services 
Exposed to 
Privatized  Competition  Decentralized  Control Group 
Municipal costs  -7.9  -9.1  -4.2  -3.6 
Cost effectiveness  -12.3  -9.8  -4.2  -3.6 
Source: Folster (1993). 
Note: Cost effectiveness is the change in quality-adjusted municipal costs plus the entrepreneur’s 
profit. 
county  services by  procurement  from private  producers  and from exposing 
public services to competition. 
Rules concerning public procurement are sharpened considerably by a new 
law that will go into effect simultaneously with the EES treaty. The new law 
requires publication of  calls for tenders in the entire EES area for large pro- 
curements. In addition, uniform rules are introduced for the conduct of pro- 
curement. A law requiring mandatory competitive tendering is being discussed 
but has not yet been enacted. 
8.1.4  Motivation of the Study 
This  study tries to estimate the effect of  Swedish cartels, regulation, and 
market structure on prices in Sweden and on costs and productivity. For rea- 
sons detailed in the next section, our estimates are biased downward. Accord- 
ingly, we view our results as indicating which of Sweden’s unusual set of insti- 
tutions have had important effects rather than the precise magnitude of these 
effects. 
Since the pioneering work of Bain (195 l),  many cross-sectional economet- 
ric studies have focused on the relation between industry concentration, profits, 
and,  sometimes,  productivity.’  These studies  generally  attempt  to test  the 
structure-conduct-performance  paradigm.  Concentration  is  considered  the 
main  dimension of  structure and the main determinant  of  performance:  at- 
tempts to exercise market power are likely to be more successful in industries 
that are highly concentrated. The main conclusion of this literature is that con- 
centration has some effect on profitability, but not a substantial effect.8 
This type of study, which was more common a decade ago, has been criti- 
cized mainly because it became  increasingly clear that concentration was a 
poor measure of monopoly power. Also, the interpretation of results was in- 
creasingly thrown into doubt. A number of studies implied that the relation 
7. Geroski (1982), e.g., estimates a simultaneous equation model with multifactor productivity 
8. For a summary, see Schmalensee (1989). 
and the concentration ratio as the dependent variables. 323  The Social Cost of Regulation and Lack of Competition in Sweden 
between concentration and profits primarily reflected the fact that larger firms 
earn higher profits and that innovative, rapidly growing firms earn temporary 
rents to innovation. That is, high profitability could reflect either high prices or 
low costs. 
Many recent studies of the relation between concentration and profitability 
have also integrated foreign trade into the analysis. Examples are Pugel(1978), 
Marvel (1980), and Chou (1986). A number of  recent Swedish studies also 
follow these methods. Olsson (1991), for example, regresses dependent vari- 
ables such as productivity growth and price increase at the industry level over 
independent variables such as concentration, export share, import share, and 
the occurrence of regulation. Erixon (1991) presents similar regressions both 
at the industry and at the company level. StHlhammar (1991) conducts a more 
sophisticated analysis following a method that has been applied by a number 
of other authors as well. StHlhammer calculates a parameter of implicit collu- 
sion for various manufacturing industries. The parameter is based on a model 
by Cowling and Waterson (1976) and is a function of the industry’s price-cost 
margin and price elasticity and the firm’s market share. The parameter for im- 
plicit collusion is then regressed over concentration as well as import and ex- 
port shares. StHlhammar (1992) integrates both foreign trade and wage deter- 
mination into the analysis. 
The study reported here is based on considerably more detailed data than 
previous work, and it utilizes new sources of  information on collusion and 
relative prices. 
8.2  Empirical Analysis 
This study uses data from a sample of Swedish manufactured products. All 
price data are at the wholesale level. For our purposes, this sample is a source 
of both strength and weakness. The data are unusually rich: we have output, 
price, cost, employment, etc. for every firm9  producing a product. As far as we 
know, this is the first study that compares  Swedish to foreign prices at the 
wholesale level; all the others focus on retail prices. Our data have a time- 
series dimension often lacking in similar studies. All these are strengths. The 
major weakness stems from our focus on manufacturing,  where departures 
from  competition  are heavily constrained  by  foreign  competition. The im- 
portant departures from competition in Sweden probably lie elsewhere, in non- 
tradeables like services, housing,  and retailing. Accordingly, our results for 
manufacturing should understate the importance of restraints on competition 
for the whole economy. Put differently, if we do find effects of cartels, regula- 
tion, etc. in this generally competitive sector-and  we do-it  would suggest 
that similar restraints in other sectors have larger effects. 
9. Except for some very small producers (fewer than ten employees) in a few cases. 324  Stefan Folster and Sam Peltzman 
8.2.1  Product Markets 
Most empirical work uses the industry as the unit of observation. Many in- 
dustries, however, contain a variety of distinct product markets, some of which 
are highly concentrated and oligopolistic, while others display intense compe- 
tition. This is especially true of technology-oriented industries such as SNI 
3852 (computers and office machines) or SNI 3831 (electrical industrial ma- 
chinery). Some studies have already shown that using more detailed data sig- 
nificantly changes basic results. Kwoka and Ravenscraft (1986), for example, 
use  “line-of-business’’ data  and report,  in  contrast to previous  studies, that 
higher concentration is correlated with lower profits.’O Here, the level of disag- 
gregation is even lower. A unit of observation in our study is a specified prod- 
uct (the seven-digit level in the United States SIC). 
Product markets were selected from the list of products used to calculate the 
producer price index. This is in itself a representative list of products produced 
in Sweden or imported into Sweden. From this list, forty-eight products were 
selected specifically because their cartel registration  status had been changed 
during the period 1976-90. An additional eighty-five products were randomly 
selected. After discarding those products that did not meet all data availability 
requirements, eighty-three products were left in the sample, of  which thirty- 
four had experienced at least one change in their cartel registration status. The 
sample is therefore not a random sample of  Swedish industry, containing as it 
does some bias toward product markets with cartel registration. However, the 
bias, if any, is slight: in 1989, 20 percent of our sample’s total sales is covered 
by  cartel agreements, as compared to SKA’s estimate of  15 percent for hori- 
zontal  cartels in the whole Swedish economy in that year. The sample also 
provides  a reasonable cross section with observations from most industries. 
Table 8.4 shows  the  share  of  sales in  each  industry  accounted  for by  our 
sample. 
For every product in the sample, we have annual data on each Swedish pro- 
ducer’s sales, costs, and assets, (employment, etc., for the period  1976-90). 
These data were provided to us by the Industrial Institute for Economic and 
Social Research.’’ 
8.2.2  Prices 
The counterfactual that we want to address is, What would Swedish prices 
be in the absence of various impediments to competition? The way in which 
we actually pursue this inquiry is to focus on the SwedishEEC price ratio for 
10. A Line of  business denotes a firm’s operations in one of the industries in which it is active. 
11. The data were assembled from two surveys conducted at the Industrial Institute for Eco- 
nomic and Social Research, the annual “Planning Survey” conducted by the Federation of Swedish 
Industry, as well as companies’ annual reports. Some of the data (costs, assets) are at the firm or 
division, rather than product, level. However, product sales average around 80 percent of firm or 
division sales in our sample. 325  The Social Cost of Regulation and Lack of Competition in Sweden 
Table 8.4  Sample Characteristics by Industry, 1976-90 
Average Sales 
per Product 
(million  Sample’s Share of 
Products Group  U.S. SICISNI’  Number of Products  kronor)  Industry’s Output 
1. Food 
2. Apparel and leather 
3. Wood and paper 
4. Packaging 
5. Industrial chemicals 
6. Drugs and cosmetics 
7. Petroleum products 
8. Rubber 
9. Stone, clay, and glass 
10. Fabricated metal 
11. Industrial machinery 
12. Electrical equipment and 
electronics 
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the same good. We ask if this ratio is higher than average when Swedish pro- 
ducers have cartel agreements, when Swedish regulation is unusually severe, 
etc. Implicitly, then, we are using the EEC prices as a “competitive” bench- 
mark. This has considerable advantages over using accounting costs for the 
competitive benchmark. For example, we can avoid problems raised by  the 
lack of correspondence between accounting and economic concepts of costs, 
by the aforementioned difficulty of  distinguishing monopoly rents from effi- 
ciency rents, etc. In addition, the Swedish products in our sample actually do 
compete with EEC producers for sales to EEC customers. In this sense, there 
is a factual basis for treating the EEC price as a competitive benchmark. But 
there are also problems raised by use of this benchmark. All our measures of 
cartelization and regulation pertain exclusively to Sweden. Ideally, we would 
like similar measures for the European Economic Community. Without them, 
our estimates of the effects of  departures from competition in Sweden are 
likely to be understated. For example, if a product is cartelized in both Sweden 
and the European Economic Community, prices in both areas could be raised 
without affecting the Sweden/EEC price ratio. We would then conclude erron- 
eously that the Swedish cartel was ineffective. This sort of possibility deserves 
to be taken especially seriously when applied to regulation. We  know that 326  Stefan Folster and Sam Peltzman 
some heavily regulated areas in Sweden (food, environmentally sensitive prod- 
ucts) tend also be regulated in the European Economic Community. Accord- 
ingly, we will probably underestimate the effect of Swedish regulation. 
Our focus on products actually exported from Sweden also imparts a down- 
ward bias to our estimates. Such a sample necessarily  excludes the worst ex- 
amples of  inefficiency, namely, products  with  costs so high they  cannot be 
competitive in export markets. Outsiders, who tend to view Sweden as a small 
open economy, might rule out the possibility that such great inefficiency could 
survive in tradable goods. However, according to Flam, Horn, and Lundgren 
(1993), it is not uncommon for Swedish product markets to be segmented from 
international competition. In such markets, the effect of reduced competition 
is likely to be larger than in our sample. 
Our measure of Swedish producer prices relative to EEC prices for the same 
product uses  data from both  areas. The Swedish data come primarily from 
comparisons of export prices to prices from the home market. This information 
is collected by SCB (Statistics Sweden) in order to calculate changes in the 
producer price index.’* A problem with these data is that the composition of 
countries to which Swedish firms export changes over time and differs between 
industries.  Building  material  firms,  for  example,  export  much  to Norway, 
which is an equally protected  market with high prices; they export little to 
Central Europe, where prices generally are much lower. 
To avoid this problem, a measure of export prices was calculated that cor- 
rects for the destination of exports. The basis for this correction is a producer 
price comparison  (by Eurostat)  in  1985 among  European  countries.  Using 
country producer price indices backward and forward from 1985 yields a ma- 
trix of  price relations among EEC countries for our sample period  1976-90. 
Export prices for exports from the Swedish companies to EEC countries were 
then related to the EEC average using the matrix described above. 
More precisely, let the export price in year y be X,,,d for export from country 
c to destination d. The home market price is Py,c  in country c.  Using the pro- 
ducer price comparison among EEC countries in  1985 allows calculation of 
the average (GDP-weighted) EEC price EI9,,.  Using national product price in- 
dices, an index (I)  could then be calculated of each country’s price for a product 
relative to the EEC average: 
12. These SCB data are not available for all product groups, in part because the price informa- 
tion is not released in cases where individual firms can be identified. We have therefore also relied 
on data on domestic and export producer prices, which can also be calculated from foreign trade 
statistics that are divided into narrow product groups following the so-called harmonized system. 
For each product group, the quantity produced, the quantity exported, the quantity imported, and 
the sales values in nominal prices for each of these categories is published. A potential problem 
with this database is that, within a product group, the products that are exported may differ from 
those that are sold in the home market. For the product group “computer software,” this is obvi- 
ously an important problem. The large majority of product groups are, however, so narrowly de- 
fined that this should not be a major problem for a statistical analysis as long as the measurement 
error is not systematic. In some cases, we have also relied on firms’  own estimates or on measure- 
ments conducted by the National Competition Board. For those product groups where we have 
two or three price measures, t-tests reveal no significant difference. 327  The Social Cost of Regulation and Lack of Competition in Sweden 
= PV~<  /E,  for y  = 1976 . . . 1990 (years of our time series), 
c = 1 . . . 12 (EEC countries). 
To illustrate, assume the following for 1985: (1) Swedish (S) widgets exported 
to Germany (G) sell for DM  104 (xE5,  s,  = 104). (2) The closest comparable 
German-produced  widget, which is the item used in the EEC price compari- 
sons, sells for DM 100 (PE5, = loo), or 4 percent less than the Swedish im- 
port. (3) The EEC price comparison shows that the German widget price is 8 
percent  above  the EEC average price  (ZE5,G = 1.08). So the average EEC- 
produced widget would sell for DM 92.00 (DM 100/1.08). 
Our procedure results in: 
XE,, = X,s,s,G/Z,s,G  = 104/1.08 = 96. 
This amounts to assuming that the 4 percent premium for the Swedish widgets 
sold in Germany is a quality premium and then adding this quality premium to 
the EEC average price of  DM 92 to arrive at an estimate of  what Swedish 
widgets would sell for in the European Economic Community. If we have ex- 
ports  to several EEC countries  simultaneously, then  XE is calculated  as a 
weighted average of the separate export prices. For  goods that have exports 
some years and no exports other years, product price indices are used to fill in 
the gaps. 
Finally, we calculate our measure of “Swedish prices relative to EEC prices,” 
as Py,  ,/XE\.  In our example, if the Swedish widgets sold for the equivalent of 
DM 120 in Sweden, we would getL3 
P,,,SIXEs5  = 120/96 = 1.25. 
Table 8.5 shows this  measure  for the fourteen  product  groups. All  prices 
leading to the measure shown in table 8.5 exclude VAT, so differences in rela- 
tive prices cannot be explained by higher Swedish indirect taxes. There appears 
to be a pervasive tendency for Swedish industrial goods prices to exceed those 
of comparable goods in the European Economic Community. No product cate- 
gory, indeed, not one of the eighty-three  sample products, has sold at lower 
average  prices in Sweden than the  European  Economic Community over a 
fifteen-year sample period. However, the Swedish price premium, which aver- 
ages 13.6 percent in our sample, is smaller-on  the order of half-than  typi- 
cally found in consumer markets. This suggests that Swedish retail margins 
are also higher than those in the European Economic Community. In fact, there 
is evidence that competitive pressures in retailing are weak in Sweden. 
In order to check the validity  of our price comparisons, we collected two 
alternative price comparisons for a subsample of products. For nineteen prod- 
ucts, firms were asked to quote prices in Sweden and the average price for the 
European Economic Community. For fifteen products, price comparisons were 
13. Conceptually, this 25 percent Swedish premium stems from two sources: (1) the 15.4 (120/ 
104) percent premium of  the Swedish price over the German price for the same widget com- 
pounded by  (2) the 8 percent premium of German widget prices over the EEC average. 328  Stefan Folster and Sam Peltzman 
Table 8.5  Swedish Prices Relative to EEC Prices, 197690 (average, EEC = 100) 
Products Group  Swedish Relative Prices  Standard Deviation 
1. Food 
2. Apparel and leather 
3. Wood and paper 
4. Packaging 
5. Industrial chemicals 
6. Drugs and cosmetics 
7. Petroleum products 
8. Rubber 
9. Stone, clay, and glass 
10. Fabricated metal 
11. Industrial machinery 
12. Electrical electronics 





































available that had been prepared by the Swedish Competition Authority and 
by Eurostat. Neither of the alternative price comparisons differed significantly 
from our relative price measure as described above.I4 
8.2.3  Cartels and Regulation 
Our data on cartels come from the Swedish cartel register. This uniquely 
Swedish institution,  abolished  in  1993, provided  a public  record  of  cartel 
agreements. This record is incomplete because some agreements may not have 
been registered.  (And some agreements may have remained  on the register 
after their substantive termination.) Nevertheless, the cartel register gives us a 
rare opportunity for empirical analysis of the effects of cartels across a variety 
of products. Moreover, although formal cartels are now illegal, cartel practices 
may persist. So our empirical analysis is of more than historical interest. 
Our measure of the intensity of regulation is even “noisier” than our cartel 
data. It comes from a classification of product groups by the Swedish Competi- 
tion Authority (SKA) according to the “significance” of various forms of regu- 
lation. We used the classification to assign dummies for significant regulation 
of  (1)  the environmental  damage from manufacture of  the product,  (2) the 
price of the product, and (3) technical standards imposed on domestic sales of 
the product.  The last category comprises goods that  must  meet  peculiarly 
Swedish specifications of product or design. These could be a nontariff barrier 
14. Chi squares of  1.95 (comparing firms’ estimates with relative prices) and 1.57 (comparing 
price comparisons by  independent institutions with our measure) were calculated with eighteen 
and fourteen degrees of  freedom. 329  The Social Cost of Regulation and Lack of Competition in Sweden 
Table 8.6  Cartel Frequency and Type 
Product Years  % of Product Years 
Any  Vertical  Horizontal 
With Cartel  Agreement  Agreement  Agreement  Both 
Products Group  Total  Agreement  (2)/(1)  Only  Only  Types 
1. Food 
2. Apparel and leather 
3. Wood and paper 
4. Packaging 
5. Industrial chemicals 
6. Drugs and 
cosmetics 
7. Petroleum products 
8. Rubber products 
9. Stone, clay, and 
glass 









150  113 
60  20 
120  50 
45  23 











4.7  60.0 
0  0 
10.0  16.7 
0  22.2 
0  19.0 
45  9 
60  6 







0  13.3 
10.0  0 
0  0 
120  19 





15.8  0 
0  0 
105  18  17.1  0  0  17.1 
135  14  10.4  0  10.4  0 
75  15 







20.0  0 
53.3  26.7 
7.8  14.1  1,245  366 
to imports, as when Swedish construction specifications effectively precluded 
some imported building materials. The standards could also restrict domestic 
entry if domestic firms have different compliance costs. 
Tables 8.6 and 8.7 summarize the frequency of cartels and regulation across 
product groups in our sample. Since we have fifteen annual observations for 
each product, we use the “product year” to measure frequency; there are 1,245 
product years (83 products X  15 years) in our sample. 
Table 8.6 reveals that 366 product years, or 29.4 percent of the sample, are 
covered by some type of cartel agreement. The data in the cartel register allow 
us to distinguish horizontal (primarily price-fixing and market-sharing) from 
vertical  (mainly  exclusive-dealing) agreements.  About  half  the agreements 
(14.1 percent of product years) are both vertical and horizontal, with the re- 
mainder roughly equally divided between the two type~.’~  Of the horizontal 
agreements (detail not shown), the majority involve price fixing.16 
15. We  include “other” types under vertical, although these can have horizontal dimensions; 
16.  Ninety percent of the horizontal agreements have price-fixing provisions; 42 percent contain 
these other agreements constitute eighteen of ninety-seven product years classified as vertical. 
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Table 8.7  Frequency of Regulation 
% of  Product Years 
Products Group  Any Regulation  Environmental  Price  Technical Standards 
1. Food 
2. Apparel and leather 
3. Wood and paper 
4. Packaging 
5. Industrial chemicals 
6.  Drugs and cosmetics 
7. Petroleum products 
8. Rubber products 
9. Stone, clay, and glass 
10. Fabricated metal 
11. Industrial machinery 
12. Electrical electronic 





















































A notable aspect of  the table is the substantial concentration of cartels by 
industry. Here,  the  food industry  deserves special mention.  It accounts for 
slightly more than one-tenth of the sample but around one-third of all the cartel 
activity. This high incidence of cartelization may be rooted in the previously 
discussed Swedish agricultural policy, which has simultaneously pushed the 
prices of the industry’s raw agricultural inputs above even those in the Euro- 
pean  Community  and  led  Sweden  to protect  the processors  against import 
competition. This relaxed threat of foreign entry may have encouraged domes- 
tic cartelization. Two other industry groups (wood/paper and chemicals) to- 
gether account for another one-quarter of the cartel activity. In these cases, 
other forms of domestic regulation may be providing entry barriers conducive 
to cartelization. 
Table 8.7 elaborates on this last point by summarizing the industrial distribu- 
tion of the three types of regulation as classified by the SKA. In our sample, 
price regulation occurs exclusively in the food sector, and it is invariably com- 
bined with tariffs and quotas against processed food imports from the Euro- 
pean Economic Community.  Thus, the price regulation category here reflects 
another aspect of Swedish agricultural policy. The other forms of regulation 
are also concentrated in a few industries: the forest products, chemical, and 
petroleum refining industries are subject to significant environmental regula- 
tion in Sweden, as in most developed countries. In technical standards, once 
more the food  industry  stands out; it accounts  for nearly  two-thirds  of  the 
sample products subject to significant technical standards. 
17. This is the only product category in our sample with tariffs or quotas against EEC imports. 331  The Social Cost of Regulation and Lack of Competition in Sweden 
The tendency of cartels to form in regulated industries can be summarized 




HORIZ = .089 + .207.ENV + .558*PRICE  + .147*TECH, 
VERT = .117 + .104.ENV + .644.PRICE + .111.TECH. 
(3.2)  (4.5)  (1.7) 
(1.4)  (4.5)  (1  .O) 
The dependent variables are the share of a product’s sample observations under 
the indicated type of cartel, and the right-hand side variables are dummies for 
the indicated type of regulation. We place t-ratios below coefficients, and the 
intercepts give the cartel frequency for products with no significant regulation. 
The regressions show that the presence of  regulation is associated with cartel 
frequencies, which are, depending on the type of regulation, anywhere from 
two or three to around seven times the cartel frequency in unregulated markets. 
Our main interest is in how this panoply of cartelization and regulation has 
affected Swedish economic performance. By performance  we mean mainly 
prices but also the level of costs and productivity growth. Our initial explora- 
tion of these issues heeds Schmalensee’s (1989, 957) advice “that the primary 
objective of  cross-section studies (in industrial organization) must be to de- 
scribe the main patterns in the data set employed as clearly and completely as 
possible.” Thus, we begin with the main regularities in the data without claim- 
ing that they represent the reduced form of an explicit model. 
8.2.4  Cartels and Regulation: Prices 
Table 8.8 provides the most basic and durable such description. It shows 
results of regressions of Swedish relative prices (see table 8.5 above) on vari- 
ous cartel and regulation dummies.I8  It tells a fairly straightforward story: 
1. Taken as a group, products under horizontal cartels have prices around 3 
percent higher than the sample average (col. 1). This estimate does not rest 
heavily on conditions peculiar to the food industry (col. 2). 
2.  However, regulation rather than cartels seems to be the primary source 
of these high relative prices (col. 3). Holding constant the effect of regulation, 
horizontal cartels have no higher prices than the sample average. 
3. The price premia associated with regulation are substantial-enough  to 
roughly double (price regulation) or raise by half (environmental regulation) 
the typical Swedish price premium of  13.6 percent for affected goods.I9  These 
18. The regressions also include a set of year dummies, the results of which are not reported in 
the table. 
19. The size of the coefficients, which are estimates of these exva premia, deserves more em- 
phasis than the f-ratios. The reported (OLS) f-ratios are exaggerated because of  the persistence 
over time of cartels and regulation. This means that we do not really have  1,245 independent 
observations. Regressions that suppressed all the time variation in prices by  using fifteen-year 
averages of the data across the eighty-three products yielded t-ratios around half those shown in 
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Table 8.8  Regression of  Swedish Relative Prices on Cartel and Regulation Variables, 
1976-90 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Independent Variables  Coef.  If1  Coef.  If1  Coef.  If1 
A. Cartel agreement: 
1. Vertical 
2. Horizontal 




3. Technical standards 
R2 
SEE 
D. Year dummies:”  - 
-.l  .I  -.8  .8  -2.5  2.5 
3.4  3.4  2.2  2.2  .I  .I 




7.0  9.1 
12.8  6.0 
.8  .7 
Yes  Yes 
.I0  .I8 
11.8  11.3 
Note: All regressions are based on 1,245 observations: 83 products X  15 years of data. CarteVregulation 
variables = + 1 if indicated type of cartel or regulation is in force in the year, 0 otherwise. 
‘All regressions include fourteen dummies, each = + 1 for observations in years 1976 . , . 1990, coeffi- 
cients not shown. 
results suggest that Swedish environmental regulation is more costly than EC 
environmental regulation.  They also reveal  price regulation  as the primary 
source of  Sweden’s unusually high food prices:  note that food products not 
covered by this regulation (row B, col. 3) actually have slightly below-average 
price premia. However, technical standards have no marginal effects on prices 
in this sample. 
4.  Vertical restraints have theoretically ambiguous competitive effects. The 
frequent  conjunction  of  vertical  restrictions  with  horizontal  cartels  in  our 
sample might arouse skepticism that vertical restrictions enhance competition 
in Sweden. But our results (col. 3, row A.l) are more consistent with that view 
than the contrary. 
5. Because our measure of regulation  is concentrated in a few industries, 
the price-increasing effects do not account for a substantial part of the overall 
Swedish price premium vis-8-vis the European Community. If the effect of the 
regulation is removed, the regression in column 3 implies that the average price 
premium would shrink from 13.6 to 11.3 percent. This result should be taken 
as a call for further work rather than as definitive estimate. If our rather crude 
measures of regulation can account for nearly 20 percent of the overall price 
premium, perhaps a more refined analysis will expand on this estimate.20 
20. The sort of refinement permitted by our data proved unavailing. We investigated the :  ,nterac- 
tion between regulation and cartels (e.g.. do cartels have different effects in regulated industries 
than in unregulated industries?) without uncovering a consistent pattern. We  also looked unsuc- 
cessfully for different effects from price-fixing and market-sharing agreements. Again, it is prerna- 
ture to conclude that such subtleties are absent. Rather, they may be hidden by the small number 
of products in our sample that fit the relevant subcategories. 333  The Social Cost of Regulation and Lack of Competition in Sweden 
Table 8.9  Market Structure, Regulation, Cartels, and Prices, 1976-90 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Independent Variables  Coef.  It1  Coef.  It1  Coef.  It1 






3. Technical standards 
1. Herfindahl index 
2. Number of firms 
D. Average wage (000 
1990 krona) 
E. Year dummies:" 
R2 
SEE 
C. Market structure: 
~ 
-2.3  2.3 
0  0 
7.  I  9.3 
11.6  7.2 
.2  .2 














2.0  -2.0  2.1 
.8  -  .8  .8 
8.9  6.6  8.7 
7.6  12.3  7.6 
.8  -.9  .8 
2.9  -9.1  2.9 
3.9  -2.8  3.9 




Our database has enough firm-specific data to enable us to add some conven- 
tional  market  structure measures to the regression. Since Bain  (195 l), well 
over a hundred studies have investigated the relations between market structure 
measures (usually concentration) and measures of market performance (usu- 
ally of profitability used as a proxy for the price marginal cost ratio). Because 
we have a direct measure of price performance  across a variety of products, 
we  need  not  rely  exclusively on  indirect measures  like profit ratios. How- 
ever, we lack EC market  structure measures that  should in principle be in- 
cluded. 
The results are summarized in table 8.9. Standing alone (col. l),  concentra- 
tion as measured by the Herfindahl index (the sum of the firms' squared market 
shares) has a weak positive effect on prices, as in most of the post-Bain litera- 
ture. However, this result is decisively reversed when the number of firms is 
added to the regression  (col. 2).  The negative coefficient on concentration is 
consistent  with  the  differential  efficiency  interpretation,  whereby  efficient 
firms raise their output (and market share) and prices decline. For example, 
suppose one of three initially equal size firms doubles its market share. Ac- 
cording to column 2, row (2.1,  the resulting increase in the Herfindahl index 
(.167)2'  would be associated with a price reduction of about 1Y2 percent. That 
price reduction implies that the market share gained by the now dominant firm 
was accompanied by a net increase in output, which presumably results from 
this firm's lowered marginal costs. 
At the same time, the regression suggests an important role for entry. Hold- 
21. The difference between 3(  1/3)2  and (2/3)2 + 2(1/6)2 334  Stefan Folster and Sam Peltzman 
ing concentration constant, each additional firm is associated (col. 2, row C.2) 
with about 3 percent lower prices. This is a potentially  significant magnitude 
in the Swedish context, where most goods have few producers. The regression 
suggests that with, say, two more producers per product roughly half the Swed- 
ish price premium could be eliminated. Entry in most of our product markets 
is not limited by  explicit legal barriers. Therefore, actually achieving an in- 
creased number of firms would require more import competition or a change 
in policies that discriminate against new firms. More stringent policy on merg- 
ers could prevent decreases in the number of firms, but our results on the bene- 
fits of concentration suggest some caution. Finally, the caveat about structural 
interpretation of  the regressions  deserves  special emphasis  here.  Causation 
running  from lower  prices,  via  widened  markets,  to more firms cannot  be 
ruled out. 
Column 3 of table 8.9 adds the industry average wage. The positive coeffi- 
cient is reasonable but economically unimportant. The main reason for this is 
that wage differences across Swedish manufacturing industries are vanishingly 
small. The fifteen-year average of the real (1990 krona) wage across the eighty- 
three products in our sample is SKr 275,000, while the standard deviation is 
only SKr 5,000, or less than 2 percent of the mean. Thus, the regression implies 
that even a four-standard-deviation move in the average wage would not affect 
prices by much more than  1 percent. 
All the previous  results on cartels and regulation  remain essentially unal- 
tered when the market structure and wage variables are added to the regression. 
8.2.5  Time-Series Analysis 
By exploiting the time-series dimension of our data, we gain a check on the 
rather negative findings on the effects of cartels that emerged from the cross- 
sectional analysis. Our sample has forty changes in cartel agreements. There 
are about as many (twenty-one) cartel formations (new agreements, added pro- 
visions) as terminations (nineteen). The time pattern of these changes is strik- 
ing. Eighteen of the formations and eleven of the terminations, or over 70 per- 
cent  of  all  the  changes,  occur  in  1979-83.  This  period  saw  considerable 
macroeconomic changes, such as an oil price “shock” and a major devaluation 
of the krona. Our turnover data suggest that the need for price realignments 
in  this  period  stimulated  new  cartels  but  also  put  pressure  on  existing 
agreements.  22 
In the next set of tables, we examines price changes that occurred around 
thirty-eight of these cartel changesz3  We also examine output changes around 
cartel changes. Output provides a measure of cartel effects that is, in principle, 
22. A few of the terminations in 1982-83  may have been stimulated by  a 1982 change in anti- 
trust law that increased the government’s power to terminate cartels proved to have harmful effects. 
But this law cannot have been a powerful deterrent given the high rate of cartel formation in 
the period. 
23. lho  occur in the terminal years of our sample. 335  The Social Cost of Regulation and Lack of Competition in Sweden 
Table 8.10  Price Changes'  and Cartel Changes 
Type of Cartel Change 
Formation  Termination 
Horizontal  Vertical  Horizontal  Vertical 
Price Variable 
and Interval"  %A  Irl  %A  Irl  %A  Irl  %A  IrI 
A. Swedish relative price: 
I. Year of change (0)  .9  1.2 
2. Year after (+  I)  -1.0  1.3 
3. Year before (-  I)  -1.3  1.7 
4.0  to +  1  -.I  .1 
5. -1  too  -.5  1.1 
6. -I  to 1  -1.5  1.1 
1. 0  .o  .o 
2. +I  .2  .6 
3. -1  -.4  1.2 
4. 0, + 1  .2  .4 
5. -l,o  -.4  .8 
6. -I,  1  -.2  .3 













.o  1.0  1.3  -3.5  3.4 
1.3  -.6  .8  1.7  1.6 
1.2  -.2  .2  .x  .8 
1.2  .4  .3  -  1.8  1.2 
1  .o  .9  1.1  -2.4  1.5 
1.7  .3  .2  -.5  .3 
1.7  .2  .6  -.4  .9 
1.1  .2  .7  -.2  .3 
.8  .3  .9  .1  .2 
2.0  .4  .9  -.6  .9 
1  .x  .6  1.0  -.4  .5 
2.1  .8  1.3  -.5  .9 
Nore: Based on regressions with change in log of price as dependent variable. Independent vari- 
ables include up to three cartel change dummies,  year dummies, and, for the Swedish price change, 
the current and two lagged values of the changes in the log of  the EEC price index for the good. 
Sample sizes vary from 913 to 1,162 depending on the lag structure. 
"Each row indicates a different assumed lag structure. For example, in row 1, it is assumed that all 
effects occur in year of cartel change; in row 6, the effects are assumed to begin a year before and 
end a year after the change. 
complementary to price effects (if price rises, output should decline). However, 
if  prices  are more poorly  measured than  output, or if product demands  are 
sufficiently elastic, output may provide the more sensitive measure of cartel 
effects. Indeed, the time-series analysis supports this view. It essentially  cor- 
roborates  our previous negative findings on the price effects of cartels while 
revealing some substantial output effects. 
Table 8.10 shows results  for two measures of price change. They are ex- 
tracted from regressions of the price change on various sets of  dummies for 
change in cartel agreements plus controls. Because cartels can form or break 
up before this appears in the cartel register, we include dummies for the year 
preceding the change. Dummies for the year following a cartel change allow 
for any lagged effects of the change. Panel A shows the change in the Swedish 
relative  (to EEC) price net of year effects. Panel B shows the change in  the 
numerator of this price ratio-the  Swedish domestic price-after  controlling 
for current and two lagged changes in the denominator (the EEC price) and 
year effects. There is some evidence of  price increases around formation of 
vertical cartels and of price decreases around their dissolution. But the over- 336  Stefan Folster and Sam Peltzman 
whelming pattern  in the table is of  small price changes, typically  1 percent 
or less  and typically  indistinguishable from zero. The one exception  covers 
dissolution of vertical agreements, and here the change seems temporary and 
is sensitive to the way price is measured. 
Table 8.11 uses  nonparametric  tests to hedge  against the possibility  that 
these negative results are due to a few atypical price changes or to price indexes 
that understate price changes. Here, we simply count signs of residuals from 
regressions of the price changes on controls. We want to see if positive residu- 
als usually accompany new cartel agreements and negative residuals accom- 
pany  cartel terminations. These sign counts are compared  to counts in  the 
whole sample and in a control group consisting of products in the same indus- 
try group with no change in cartel status. The results are perhaps a bit sharper 
than those in  table 8.10 above. The main tendency is for prices to tick up when 
cartels are formed and down when they dissolve. But statistical significance is 
often lacking. The relatively  small sample sizes limit the power of  our tests 
and more refined analysis of, for example, the interaction of  cartel changes 
with reg~lation.~~  Nevertheless, they add to the impression that Sweden’s toler- 
ance  of  cartel  agreements  was  not  a  major  source  of  its  historically  high 
prices.25 
The evidence on output is much  less equivocal:  output fell substantially 
when cartels were formed and rose when they were dissolved. This is shown 
in tables 8.12 and 8.13, which are the analogs for output to tables 8.10 and 
8.11 above. Table 8.12 shows that, depending on the time span and type of 
agreement, output fell anywhere from 6 to 13  percent when a cartel was formed 
and rose a comparable amount when a horizontal cartel was terminated.26  (The 
apparently weaker results for vertical cartel terminations should be discounted 
because they are based on only one “pure” case.)27  Table 8.13 shows that these 
results are not due to a few outliers. In over 90 percent  of  the cases, cartel 
formation is accompanied by abnormally low output growth and cartel termi- 
nation by abnormally high growth in the year of the change. There is no simi- 
larly  strong  pattern  for  the  year  preceding  and  the  year  following  cartel 
changes. 
Half the cartel formations involve products subject to stringent environmen- 
24. We did attempt to divide each sample into subsamples of  products subject to some form of 
regulation and those not so subject. The consistent pattern was that prices of the regulated products 
rose and fell less frequently than other goods when cartels formed or dissolved. But this difference 
was insignificant. 
25. The tests in tables 8.5 and 8.6 above were repeated-with  essentially identical results-on 
(1) a sample consisting only of products that had undergone cartel switches in the period 1976-90 
and (2) price change variables measured as deviations from the  1976-90  mean change for the 
product. 
26. Essentially identical results were obtained from a sample including only those products with 
change in cartel status. So, e.g., for these products, output growth was 6 percent below trend in 
the year in which a horizontal cartel formed. 
27. In eight other cases, vertical and horizontal agreements are terminated simultaneously. Table 8.11  Frequency of Positive Residuals for Price Changes around 
Cartel Changes 
Price Variable, 
Type of Change  Frequency Positive  Control Group 
(number of cases)  Residuals  Frequency  Difference  I  t  I 
A. Swedish relative price: 
I. Cartel formation: 
1. Horizontal (10): 
a) Year of change 
b) Year before 
c) Year after 
2. Vertical (13): 
a) Year of  change 
b) Year before 
c) Year after 
11. Cartel termination: 
1  Horizontal (17): 
a) Year of change 
b) Year before 
c) Year after 
2. Vertical (9): 
a) Year of change 
b) Year before 
c) Year after 
B. Swedish price: 
I. Cartel formation: 
1. Horizontal (10): 
a) Year of change 
b) Year before 
c) Year after 
2. Vertical (I 2): 
a) Year of change 
b) Year before 
c) Year after 
11.  Cartel termination: 
1. Horizontal (16): 
a) Year of change 
b) Year before 
c) Year after 
2. Vertical (9): 
a) Year of change 
b) Year before 
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Note: Numbers in parentheses are number of cases. Cartel with both horizontal and vertical provis- 
ions (three formations, eight terminations) is counted twice. Cases used in computations  vary 
because of different underlying lag structures of the two regressions used to generate residuals 
and  because  1975 and  1991 data are  unavailable. + (-)  = significantly (5 percent)  greater 
(smaller) than overall sample frequency. Control group is products in same industry group with 
no change in cartel status in the relevant period. 338  Stefan Folster and Sam Peltzman 
Table 8.12  Output Changes and Cartel Changes 
Qpe  of Cartel Change 
Interval 
Formation  Termination 
Horizontal  Vertical  Horizontal  Vertical 
%A  It1  %A  It1  %A  It1  %A  It1 
I. Yearofchange (0)  -5.8  2.7  -10.5  5.7  +6.7  3.3  +2.5  .9 
2. Year after (+  1)  -3.0  1.4  +3.8  2.0  -.4  .2  -.4  .1 
3. Year before (-  1)  -4.1  1.9  1.0  .5  -.2  .1  -1.3  .4 
4.0to+l  -8.8  2.9  -7.1  2.7  +6.2  2.1  +1.9  .5 
5. -1 too  -10.0  3.3  -9.7  3.6  i6.5  2.2  i1.4  .3 
6.  -1 to 1  -13.3  3.5  -6.4  1.9  f6.2  1.7  +1.3  .3 
Note; See the note to table 8.10 above. This table is based on regressions with the change in log 
of output, year t minus the average annual change, 1976-90  as the dependent variable, and year 
dummies as independent variables. Sample size varies from 996 to 1,162 depending on the log 
structure. 
tal regulation. In the year of a cartel formation, output of these goods fell much 
more (17 percent for horizontal and 20 percent for vertical cartel formations) 
than for other goods. These differences, which are statistically significant, may 
imply that the usual threat to cartel stability from potential output expansion is 
weakened by environmental restrictions. Actual output expansion when cartels 
terminated proved to be no different for goods subject to environmental regula- 
tion (one-third of  terminations) than for others. 
There is an obvious tension between the results on price changes and those 
on output changes that we cannot resolve here. Taken literally, the results seem 
inconsistent  with rational  cartel behavior,  which  employs output restriction 
only if this raises prices. Alternatively, our results might suggest that our price 
measure is not accurately reflecting transaction prices  or nonprice attributes 
(quality, delivery time, etc.) of products. However, tests for changes in two 
measures of  profit margin around cartel changes yielded  the same negative 
results as for prices.28  This lack of response of profit margins to cartel changes 
implies that measurement problems alone do not account for our odd results 
on prices. 
8.2.6  Cartels Regulation and the Efficiency of Production 
Standard theory does not have much to say about the effect of cartelization 
or regulation on the efficiency of production. Nevertheless, at least since Adam 
Smith contended that “monopoly . . . is a great enemy to good management,” 
economists have suspected a connection between competition and production 
28. The two measures, described more fully in the next section, are profits before capital costs/ 
sales and value added per employee. All else the same, these would increase if prices rose or 
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Table 8.13  Frequency of Positive Residuals, Output Changes around 
Cartel Changes 
Type of Change  Frequency Positive  Control Group 
(number of cases)  Residuals  Frequency  Difference  I  t I 
I. Cartel formation: 
1. Horizontal (10): 
a) Year of change 
b) Year before 
c) Year after 
a) Year of change 
b) Year before 
c) Year after 
11. Cartel termination: 
1. Horizontal (17): 
a) Year of change 
b) Year before 
c) Year after 
a) Year of change 
b) Year before 
c) Year after 
2. Vertical (1  3): 

























-  .42 
-.25 
.32 
-  .65 
-.18 
.21 
+  .48 
-.11 
+  .05 
+  .62 













1  .o 
Nore: See the notes to tables 8.11 and 8.12 above. 
efficiency. Our data allow us to investigate this connection for Sweden and 
thereby to shed light on the question of whether lack of competition in Sweden 
has contributed to the perceived high-cost structure of its manufacturing sector. 
We  begin  with regressions  describing the  connection  between  measures  of 
static efficiency and productivity  growth, on the one hand, and cartelization 
and regulation, on the other. 
8.2.7  Static Efficiency 
We use two measures related to static efficiency: gross profits as a percent- 
age of sales (the “price-cost margin”) and value added per worker.29  All else 
the same (including prices), more efficient use of resources would raise both 
measures. The two measures differ in their treatment of labor rents. These re- 
duce profitability but not value added.30 So labor rents show up as an ineffi- 
ciency in the profit-based  measure but not  in value added per worker. Our 
choice of measures is dictated in part by lack of data on raw material prices. 
This precludes investigation of efficiency in the use of  raw materials. Finally, 
our efficiency measures are for the aggregate of the firms or divisions produc- 
ing a product, while the competition measures are product specific.  Recall, 
29. Gross profits are before depreciation and capital costs, and value added is just gross profits 
30. Any rents to outside suppliers would reduce both profits and value added. 
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Table 8.14  ProfitslSales, Value Added per Worker, Competition and Regulation 
Profits/Sales X  lo2  Value AddedNorker (SKr 000) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 







3. Technical standards 
C. Capital intensity: 
1. Capitahales 
2. Capitallworker (SKr 000) 
D. Market structure: 
1. Herfindahl index 
2. Number of firms 
R2 
SEE 
E. Year dummies: 
-.2  .3 
1.3  1.3 
3.8  5.2 
1.5  4.9 
.4  .4 




-.o  .o 
1.7  1.1 
3.8  5.3 
1.4  4.8 
.l  .7 
1.4  3.5 
9.0  2.9 




-21  1.5 
29  2.  I 
46  4.3 
11  3.4 
22  I .5 




-  15  1.1 
30  2.1 
44  4.1 
81  3.6 
19  1.3 
.22  19.3 
68  1.5 




however, that these products account for around 80 percent of firm or division 
sales in our sample. 
Table 8.14 summarizes the relation between both measures and competition/ 
regulation. (The regressions include capital intensity variables as controls.) 
The results here need to be interpreted in the light of the previously discussed 
price effects summarized in tables 8.8 and  8.9 above because either higher 
prices or greater efficiency can raise profits or value added. Specifically, if 6, 
or bv,  denotes a coefficient of interest in the profit or value added regression, 
respectively, of table 8.14, and if  b,,  is the coefficient of  the same variable in 
the earlier price regression, the following approximations3’  obtain: 
(3) 
% A costlunit - b,, 
Ai 
3 1. These follow from the relations 
profits -  price -  unit cost  __- 
sales  once 
value added 
worker 
= (price -  purchases per unit) 
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Table 8.15  Estimated Effect of Competition and Regulation on Unit Costs and 
Output per Worker 
Effect of Unit Change on:  Effect of Unit Change on: 
Variables 
Cost/Output  OutputNorker 
(%)  Ill  (%)  IrI 
A. Cartels: 
1. Vertical  -1.8  1.5  +1.6  .5 
2. Horizontal  -2.8  1.9  f4.0  1.1 
I. Environmental  +  1.3  1.2  -6.8  2.5 
2. Price  1.8  .8  -12.1  2.1 
3. Technical standards  -1.9  1.3  5.5  1.5 
1. Herfindahl index  -  19.2  4.0  34.3  3.0 
2. Number of firms  -3.9  3.5  5.8  2.3 
B. Regulation: 
C. Market structure: 
Nore: Based on coefficients from col. 2 of table 8.9 and cols. 2 and 4 of table 8.14. For formula 
combining these coefficients, see the text. Estimates are taken at sample means of all relevant vari- 
ables. 
-  b5  -~  % A output per worker 
~-  _____ 
Ai  value added/worker 
(4) 
-  bP,  ~~__ 
(price) (value added/sales)' 
We can then estimate the effect of a change in competition or regulation  (Ai) 
on efficiency by  appropriately combining the two coefficients. The results of 
this exercise are shown in table 8.15, which uses the price regression in column 
2 of table 8.9 above and the regressions in columns 3 and 4 of table 8.14 above 
to generate estimates of the effect of competition and regulation on static effi- 
ciency at the sample means of the relevant variables. To  illustrate how these 
estimates were arrived at, we can work through a specific case. Table 8.15 says 
that Swedish environmental regulation  has reduced output per worker by 6.8 
percent.32  This is the net result of  effects on price (table 8.9) and on value 
added (table 8.14). It is computed as follows. According to column 2 of table 
8.9, environmental regulation raises Swedish relative prices by 6.8 points, or 6 
percent of the mean value (1  13.6) of the Swedish relative price index. By itself, 
a 6 percent price increase would raise sales by 6 percent. Because value added 
is only about 40 percent of sales, a 6 percent sales increase would be amplified 
32. The associated It1 of 2.5 (and all other r-ratios in the table) is subject to two offsetting biases: 
(1) the aforementioned (n. 18) upward bias stemming from overstatement of the true degrees of 
freedom and (2) a downward bias resulting from the assumed independence of the coefficients 
b,,l and b,, or bmz  when they are likely to be positively correlated. 342  Stefan Folster and Sam Peltzman 
into a 15 percent (6/.4) rise of value added, which would translate into an extra 
SKr 78,000 per worker (in 1990 prices, given a mean value added per worker 
of around SKr 520,000).  However, column 4, row B. 1 of table 8.14 tells us that 
only SKr 44,000, or 56 percent  of  the potential increase in  value added, is 
attained. Table 8.15 attributes this shortfall of SKr 34,000 to a decline in output 
per worker. In short, the actual increase in value added (about 8 percent) is the 
result  of  the  15 percent potential increase from higher prices and the partly 
offsetting roughly 7 percent reduction in output per worker. 
The results in table 8.15 suggest that cartels are not associated with a loss 
of production efficiency. In fact, if anything, cartelized industries were more 
efficient. Environmental regulation and price regulation, however, do seem to 
be associated with nontrivial productivity losses. The former is expected be- 
cause expenses for environmental protection do not produce measurable out- 
put. The large (12.1 percent) productivity  loss for price-regulated goods im- 
plies  that  the  minimum  prices  shelter  considerably  inefficiency.  And  the 
correspondingly modest unit cost effect (1.8 percent) suggests that suppliers 
and  workers  are  sharing the  costs  of  this  inefficiency  with  firms and  con- 
sumers. 
The results for the market structure measures imply an important connection 
between competition and efficiency, but one that needs to be interpreted care- 
fully. At the margin, an extra firm is associated with 6 percent increased output 
per worker. But the results for the Herfindahl measure of concentration imply 
that attempts to maintain the number of firms by a vigorous anticoncentration 
policy would be mistaken. Consistent with the previously articulated differen- 
tial efficiency story, the more concentrated industries tend to be the more effi- 
cient. The large numbers in row C.l of table 8.15 need to be discounted be- 
cause they refer to an  unrealistic shift from atomistic competition to monopoly. 
A more realistically  modest change in the Herfindahl index, say .2,33  would 
still suggest a considerable productivity  gain (around 7 percent higher output 
per worker) from expansion of  efficient leading firms. Similarly, the results 
imply that the decline in Swedish concentration over the sample period is asso- 
ciated with reduced output per worker and higher unit costs. The average de- 
cline in the Herfindahl index has been .08. The results in table 8.15 translate 
this into a  1% percent reduction of  output per worker. Recall that all the re- 
duced average concentration has come from the largest firm’s loss of market 
share. So the differential efficiency story would link the reduced efficiency to 
a steady weakening of the largest firms’ productivity advantages. If there is a 
policy implication in these results, it would be to eliminate any barriers to new 
entrants while allowing market forces to determine how concentrated markets 
become. 
33. Approximately the result when one of  three previously equal sized firms doubles its mar- 
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8.2.8  Productivity Growth 
For each product in our sample, we estimated the average annual growth in 
productivity for 1976-90  under two measures: a “Solow residual” estimate of 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth and the more traditional growth of out- 
put per worker. The TFP growth estimate is 
output growth -  a(1abor input growth) -  (1 -  a)(capital input growth), 
where a  is labor’s share of output. This is an estimate of the growth of output 
per unit of  We are limited to a two-input production function by  the 
aforementioned lack of  data on material inputs, and we also recall that our 
output measure is at the firm rather than the product level. We estimated a  as 
(wage costdvalue added) over the fifteen-year period for each  It is 
of particular importance to note that our output series is obtained by deflating 
sales by a product price index. Total employment and an estimate of the real 
value  of  fixed  assets constitute  our input  measures.  For our  sample,  TFP 
growth averages 1.62 percent per year, while labor productivity grows at 2.46 
percent  per year. These are broadly typical  of  manufacturing in Europe and 
North America over the period 1976-90. 
The relation between TFP growth and competition and regulation is spelled 
out in table 8.16. The first two regressions show that cartelized and regulated 
industries have experienced generally subpar productivity growth. These nega- 
tive effects are not always precisely estimated, but they tend to be numerically 
large. For example, regression  (2) implies essentially zero TFP growth for 
products subject to horizontal cartels. This regression also implies, somewhat 
in contrast to the results for the level of productivity, that higher concentration 
and more firms are associated with lower TFP growth. This is similar to Salin- 
ger’s (1990) finding that concentrated industries in the United States experi- 
enced a reversal of previously favorable cost trends in roughly the same period. 
The third regression in table 8.16 adds an industry-group EEC price trend 
variable. This is meant as a control for industry-specific factors, hopefully un- 
related to Swedish competitive and regulatory conditions, which affect produc- 
tivity in all countries. For example, productivity  in electronics has generally 
been well above average, and this is reflected  in generally declining relative 
prices for electronics products both in Sweden and the European Economic 
Community. Since we lack direct estimates of industry sector TFP growth out- 
side Sweden, we use the EEC price trend as a proxy. The addition of this vari- 
able essentially  wipes out every previous  result and dramatically boosts the 
34. It is based on the assumption of factor neutral technical progress and Cobb-Douglas tech- 
35. An alternative in which the share of  capital was obtained by  multiplying the samplewide 
nology. 
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Table 8.16  Total Factor Productivity Growth, 1976-90 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Independent Variables  Coef.  It1  Coef.  It1  Coef.  It1 
A. Cartels: 
I.  Horizontal  -I  .22  1.7  -  1.56  2.1  -  .04  .2 
2. Vertical  +  .46  .7  .47  .7  .I1  .6 
1. Environmental  -  .47  1.1  -  .53  1.3  +.I9  1.6 
2. Price  -.41  .5  -.I5  .2  -  .20  .8 
3.  Technical standards  -.74  1.3  -  .96  1.7  +.01  .4 
1. Herfindahl index  -3.30  1.7  -  .25  .4 
2. Number of firms  -  .77  1.7  -.I0  .8 
price change in EEC, 
1976-90  -.98  30.4 
B. Regulation: 
C. Market structure: 
D. Median industry 
.I0  .I1  .93 
R2 
SEE  1.54  1.53  .42 
Note: Sample = 83 products. Dependent variable is annual percentage growth of total factor pro- 
ductivity between  1976-77  and 1989-90.  For definition of total factor productivity, see the text. 
Cartel, regulation, and market structure measures are 1976-90  averages of annual values. EEC 
industry price change is the median value for the industry group of the annual rate of change of 
EEC product price indexes for 1976-77  to 1989-90. 
regression’s fit. The coefficient of this variable is around -1,  which might sug- 
gest that it is a perfect proxy for industrywide TFP trends.36 
There is, however, need for caution in taking this result at face value. Recall 
that output growth is estimated as the difference between the growth of sales 
and of product prices. Any measurement error in industry price trends common 
to Sweden and the European Economic Community will be translated into an 
opposite-signed  error in estimated  TFP growth. For example, if  electronics 
price indexes generally understate quality improvement, TFP growth in elec- 
tronics will be correspondingly understated. The coefficient of -1  on the EEC 
price variable would also be consistent with the (probably unrealistic) extreme 
case in which the common measurement error accounted for all the variance 
in price trends across products. Correlation  of this error with the cartel and 
regulatory variables could then bias their coefficients in the third regre~sion.~’ 
Table 8.17 repeats the exercise in table 8.16 using a labor productivity mea- 
sure. Growth of capital per worker is added as a control. The results of interest 
are nearly identical. So any conclusions seem insensitive to the way productiv- 
ity growth is measured. 
36. If TFP growth is translated point for point into lower price growth. 
37. Electronics and fabricated metals have the best measured price performance in both the 
European Economic Community and Sweden, and they show relatively little cartel and regula- 
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Table 8.17  Growth Rate of Output per Worker, 1976-90 
(1)  (2)  (3) 





I.  Environmental 
2. Price 
3. Technical standards 
1. Herfindahl index 
2. Number of firms 
D. Growth rate of 
capital per worker 













1.6  -1.48 
.6  .4  1 
1.2  -  .56 
.3  -  .01 
1.4  -  .98 
-2.99 
-  .72 
3.8  .86 
.I9 
1.48 
2.0  -  .02 
.6  .05 
1.4  .15 
.o  -  .05 
1.8  +  .02 
I .5  -  .05 
1.6  -  .90 













Our conclusions about dynamic efficiency have to be tentative. What is clear 
is that the cartelized and regulated sectors in Sweden generally have been sub- 
stantial laggards in TFP growth. This tendency is especially pronounced for 
horizontal cartels and for environmental  and technical standards regulation. 
What remains unclear is the precise role of Swedish cartels and Swedish regu- 
lation in bringing this result about. Among the possibilities that we must ac- 
knowledge are that (1) the pressure to cartelize an industry and provide regu- 
latory  barriers  to  entry  is  greater  where  productivity  growth  is  low  and 
(2) barriers to competition similar to those in Sweden operate in the European 
Economic Community  for similar products and hinder productivity  growth 
there to roughly the same extent as in Sweden. The one reasonably clear con- 
clusion from our data is that cartelization and regulation have not enhanced 
productivity growth in Swedish rnanufa~turing.~~ 
8.2.9  Simultaneous Equations 
In the previous  analysis, determination of  firms’ productivity  growth and 
market prices were analyzed separately. For several reasons, there may be im- 
portant linkages between the two. A productivity increase tends to lower the 
38. We can also say that any effects of cartelization take some time to show up. For the sample 
of products with changes in cartel status, we regressed the difference between annual and long- 
run TFP growth on cartel and year dummies. A similar regression was estimated for labor produc- 
tivity growth. The coefficients of the cartel dummies were small and insignificant in both regres- 
sions. This means that productivity growth for the same product does not noticeably lag behind 
its long-run trend in the years just following a cartel agreement. 346  Stefan Folster and Sam Peltzman 
Table 8.18  Simultaneous Estimation of Relative Prices and TFP Growth 
Relative Price  TFP Growth 







3. Technical standards 
price change in EEC, 
D. Dependent variables: 
C. Median industry 
1976-90 
1. Relative price 
2. TFT  growth 
R’ 
SEE 





-  .03 
.ll 
.09 
1.2  -.om1  0 
.3  ,000 1  0 
2.5  .04  2.0 
2.2 
0  .004  .2 
-.98  28.1 
.6  -.21  .8 
.93 
.057 
profit-maximizing price, even for a firm with monopoly power. Holding con- 
stant the level of cartelization and regulation, one would therefore expect firms 
with faster productivity growth to charge lower prices. 
The price that a firm charges may in turn affect productivity growth. Monop- 
oly power should be reflected in the price levels, even after controlling for 
our measures of  cartelization and regulation, since these probably contain a 
considerable measurement error. To  the extent that monopoly power affects 
productivity growth, one would therefore expect a relation between the price 
level and productivity growth. 
In order to test these linkages, the simplest approach is to estimate a simulta- 
neous equation model following the structure of the productivity growth equa- 
tions reported in the previous section. In the first system in table 8.18, TFP 
growth and relative (to EEC) prices are the dependent variables in a cross- 
sectional estimation over the eighty-three product markets. Relative prices and 
“level” variables are averages over the period 1976-90. 
As in any simultaneous system, a key question is how well the equations are 
identified. In this estimation, the EEC price trend variable is a natural choice 
as a variable to identify the productivity growth equation. For the relative price 
equation, we use the price regulation dummy as an identifying variable. This 
assumes that  price  and  quantity  regulation  affect productivity  growth  via 
price changes. 
The results in table 8.18 broadly confirm the single-equation results reported 
above. Environmental regulation affects both productivity and prices. The in- 
dependent linkage between relative prices and TFP growth appears small. One 
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rather than the relative price level. Substituting relative price change for rela- 
tive price levels yields similar conclusions, however, and is therefore not re- 
ported here. 
Instead, a more careful modeling of how prices affect productivity seems to 
bear fruit. The most frequently stated argument is that high prices may imply 
high profits. High profits in turn reduce employees’ efforts and therefore de- 
press productivity growth. The link between prices and profits, however, may 
be quite weak. Therefore, one may get stronger results by explicitly modeling 
the effects of prices on the profit rate and the effects of the profit rate on pro- 
ductivity growth. 
We  replace the simple productivity growth variable with a new variable, 
“relative productivity growth,” which  shows productivity growth relative to 
that in EEC countries. This is calculated as 
relative productivity growth = (1 + TFP growth)/ 
(1 -  median industry price change in EEC). 
This achieves essentially the same as was done in previous regressions by in- 
troducing EEC price change as an independent variable. However, it ensures 
that productivity growth is also corrected by EEC price change in the profit 
equation. 
Since productivity growth also affects profits, we model this as a system 
with  three  simultaneous  equations with  the  dependent variables  being  the 
profit rate, relative productivity growth, and relative prices. The profit equation 
contains relative productivity and relative prices as explanatory variables, and 
the wage rate is used to identify the equation. The relative productivity equa- 
tion contains profits and the cartel and regulatory variables. It is identified by 
the cartel and regulatory variables since we let the relative price enter recur- 
sively only into the profits equation. Thus, the relative price is a function only 
of the cartel and regulatory variables. This is motivated because theoretically 
relative prices should affect relative productivity only through profits, not di- 
rectly. 
The results are shown in table 8.19. They indicate that relative productivity 
growth has a significantly positive effect on the profit rate. The profit rate, 
on the other hand, has a significantly negative effect on productivity growth. 
Environmental regulation and price and quantity regulation raise relative prices 
and thus feed through to the profit rate and relative productivity growth. 
These results indicate that monopoly power may indeed have a significantly 
negative effect on productivity growth via the profit rate. However, our mea- 
sures of monopoly power in the form of the cartelization variables may contain 
too much measurement error to pick up much of a direct link from cartelization 
to productivity growth. 
Finally, a common argument is that high profits lead to high wage demands. 
Therefore, wages should be treated as an endogenous variable. We have esti- 
mated such models also, but the results remain broadly the same. This is not 348  Stefan Folster and Sam Peltzman 
Table 8.19  Simultaneous Estimation of the Profit Rate, Relative TFP Growth, 
and Relative Prices 
Relative TFP 
Profit Rate  Growth  Relative Prices 







3. Technical standards 
C. Wage level 
D. Dependent variables: 
1. Profit rate 
2. Relative TFP growth 
3. Relative price 
R2 
SEE 
-.012  .6 
,006  .23 
,009  .6 
-  ,032  .99 
,008  .5 
-  ,004  .2 
.39  2.5 
1.85  3.3 
.34  1 .I5 
.I3  .15 
.2  .09 
-  .04  1.1 
.03  .7 
.07  2.2 
,115  2.1 
-  ,0005  .o 1 
-.I3  .3 
.lI 
.09 
surprising since wage  levels in  Sweden have primarily been  determined  at 
more central levels than  the firm.  For that reason, they do not  differ much 
between firms. 
8.3  Summary and Conclusions 
The broad conclusion to which our results point is that Sweden’s tolerance 
of cartels and its regulatory policy have negatively affected the performance 
of Swedish manufacturing. We have found evidence of  such negative effects 
on prices, output, productivity, and productivity growth. These effects are sum- 
marized in table 8.20. It can be seen at a glance that virtually  all the effects 
that we have been able to detect are negative and that they are often substantial. 
As between the effects of cartels and regulation, the latter are the more sub- 
stantial. 
The effects that we have been able to measure are probably understated. In 
essence, we have measured these effects as differences between a “treatment” 
group and a “control” group of products. To estimate the effects of the treat- 
ment (cartels, regulation) properly, we would need a control group entirely free 
of  treatment effects. However, this is not what we have. The control group 
includes products with no publicly registered cartel agreements. But it includes 
products with undisclosed cartels. The control group include products without 
unusually  severe regulation of three spec$c  types. But it includes products 
subject, in varying degrees, to some of these and to other kinds of regulation 
that may have effects on competition. Accordingly, we are able to estimate only 349  The Social Cost of Regulation and Lack of Competition in Sweden 
Table 8.20  Summary of Effects of Cartels and Regulation 
Institution  Productivity  TFF’ Growth 









2. Price (food) 




Relevant averages from 
sample 
-2%  in vertical  -6%  to -  13% after  No  -  I .6% for 
agreements  agreement, +6%  horizontal 
after agreement is  agreements 
terminated 





-  12%  No 
No  -1% 
+13.6%  5.6% standard  SKr 520,000  + 1.6%/ 
Sweden v.  EEC  deviation of yearly  value added  year TFP 
output change  per worker  growth 
Nore: “No” = no effect found. . . . = data unavailable. 
differences between more and less cartelization and regulation rather than the 
full effects of these treatments. Also, recall that there is a further downward 
bias in our estimates of price effects stemming from our inability to control 
for effects of policies within the European Economic Community that are sim- 
ilar to those in Sweden. Specifically, the estimated price effects of environmen- 
tal and price regulation (+6 percent) and +  11 percent) are the (extra) premi- 
ums  over  similar products  sold in  EEC  markets.  But  those  products  (e.g., 
chemicals  and food) are also heavily  regulated  in  the  European  Economic 
Community. So our estimates imply that Swedish regulations has historically 
been more stringent than EEC regulation. They do not, however, reveal the full 
price effects of the regulation. 
Finally, recall that we  analyzed prices  of tradables that  Sweden exports. 
Thus, the Swedish producers in our sample have survived the rigors of interna- 
tional competition. By focusing on this relatively efficient and competitive sec- 
tor, we have missed the worst examples of inefficiency and high prices induced 
by  regulation  or lack of  competition in Sweden. The fact that we found any 
significant price  and efficiency  effects in this  sample suggests larger, more 
widespread effects in the more sheltered areas of the economy. 
Because of the preceding caveats, our results should be regarded as sugges- 
tive rather than as precise estimates of the negative effects of cartelization and 
regulation. It seems safe to conclude that these effects are hardly trivial. They 
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growth that we have found in the regulated and cartelized sectors of Swedish 
manufacturing. 
Sweden’s prospective  entry  into  the  European  Community  has  begun  to 
force changes in the institutions that governed the period we have studied. Be- 
cause of this, our results give grounds for optimism about the likely evolution 
of  Swedish manufacturing. The adoption of EC antitrust standards will pre- 
sumably narrow the scope for cartels in Sweden. Our results imply that a less 
heavily cartelized Swedish manufacturing sector will be more efficient, both 
statically and dynamically. Inevitably, integration into the European Commu- 
nity will bring pressure for a convergence of regulatory institutions. This will 
lead to a corresponding convergence of  costs, which,  our results imply, will 
improve Sweden’s relative position. Indeed, there is evidence that some of this 
has already occurred. We broke the period 1976-90  into halves and estimated 
separate price effects of  regulation  in each half. For both price and environ- 
mental regulation, the effect on Swedish prices was greater in the first half 
(1976-82)  of this period than in the second. In the case of environmental regu- 
lation, the extra Swedish price premium narrows significantly from 10 percent 
in 1976-82  to around 3 percent subsequently. A smaller and less statistically 
reliable39  narrowing occurred for goods subject to price regulation, from a 15 
percent to a 10 percent extra price premium. Pressures for further narrowing 
of these Swedish price premiums can only grow as Sweden integrates into the 
European Community. These pressures will be uneven because the degree of 
regulation and cartelization has varied  across  Swedish industries. The food 
sector, in particular,  stands out among those Swedish industries that will be 
most  substantially affected by the convergence of Swedish and EC policies. 
Much of this industry has been cartelized, subjected to minimum price regula- 
tion, and protected from entry by products not meeting Swedish technical stan- 
dards. If these practices are eliminated, our data suggest that Swedish food 
prices will decline by around  10 percent in real terms at the wholesale level 
and that output per worker  will grow a like amount. At the  same time, the 
industry is likely to reverse its distinctly subpar record of productivity growth. 
Swedish manufacturing is highly concentrated, and this can raise concerns 
about the vigor of competition. Our results, however, suggest that such con- 
cerns are overstated. Indeed, we find that the most concentrated Swedish in- 
dustries tend to have significantly lower domestic prices and a substantial, al- 
though  narrowing,  advantage  in  output  per  worker  over  less  concentrated 
industries. We  interpret this to mean that, where regulatory  barriers to entry 
are  absent, high  concentration  in  Sweden  reflects  cost  advantages  of  large 
firms. The proviso here is potentially important because we find lower prices 
and higher productivity where there are more firms. These twin results suggest 
the need for distinguishing between concentration and the number of firms in 
evaluating Swedish market structure. In particular, it would not be surprising 
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if Swedish production becomes more concentrated as its markets become more 
accessible to EEC producers. This would occur if less-efficient domestic pro- 
duction is replaced by imports. In this case, as long as the number of  sellers is 
not reduced, our results imply favorable price and productivity effects flowing 
from the increased concentration.  The  implications  for competition policy 
seem fairly straightforward. It is our layman’s impression that EEC policy to- 
ward mergers is generally less restrictive than that of the United States. Were 
it otherwise, Sweden might be ill served by legal restraints on the mergers and 
exits that will accompany the realignment of its manufacturing capacity when 
it joins the European Economic  Community. Removal of institutional obstacles 
to entry and regulatory restraints on competition would appear to merit more 
attention than restraints on concentration. 
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